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COMOR-D-54/1


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29 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Security Handling of



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1. At the meeting of the United States Intelligence Board on 16 May 1961, it was determined that [redacted] will be handled under the security procedures of the TALENT Control System. The intention was

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
a. To avoid introduction of another security control system and

b. To enjoy the successful protection which the TALENT Control System had afforded other sensitive materials.

2. Since that time numerous reports with the identifying codeword [redacted] have appeared under injunction to the chiefs of intelligence in the participating agencies that the reports may be shown only to persons authorized by them. An additional requirement, however, different from normal TALENT operations, was that all readers were required to sign an acknowledgement of having read the documents.

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3. The administration of the TALENT Control System is based upon effective management in each participating agency under the immediate guidance of the TALENT Control Officer and the TALENT Security Officer subject to such advice or direction as he may receive from his agency's participation in the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, which is the mechanism through which interagency coordination and management is achieved and of course subject to the direction of his intelligence chief and the United States Intelligence Board. Accordingly, it is essential that the members of COMOR should be fully informed of the inclusion of new material in the TALENT Control System so that they may properly advise their respective chiefs of intelligence.



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Revised 18 Dec. 1961

4. You are requested at this time

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a. To advise those in your agency who have had access to [] reports that there should be no speculation or discussion about the source of these reports, inasmuch as such speculation increases the security risk and the possibility that we might suffer the loss of the source.

b. In accordance with standing TALENT procedures, to bring to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence via the TALENT Security Officer/CIA any breaches of security regarding this material.

c. To make a survey of those whose positions have changed internally and who therefore no longer have a "need to know" or who are being assigned abroad and to debrief all falling in either category. Certain exceptions may be made to the "assigned abroad" category but such exceptions will depend on official approval of the originating office of a written request, addressed to TSO/CIA.

d. To ensure that those who travel abroad on a temporary basis do not discuss [] or imply the existence of such material except at the explicit direction of the senior intelligence office (or his designee) of the traveller's agency. Such direction will in every instance depend on approval of the DCI, arranged through the TSO/CIA. []

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e. Recipients of [] reports may request of the originating office that information contained in reports be sanitized for distribution outside the TALENT Control System. The channel for such request is the []

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3, 4--DIA, []

5--JCS TCO

6, 7--OACSI TCO

8--ONI TCO

9, 10, 11--AFCIN TCO

12, 13--NSA TCO

James Q. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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Copy 1--DDP
14--AC/DPD
15--DDI(P) TCO
16--OCI TCO
17--OSI TCO
18--ORR TCO
19--DIR NPIC
20--TSO CIA
21--C/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
22--C/DMD/NPIC
23--LO/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
24--DDP TCO
25--Intel/DPD
26--SO/DPD
27-30--C/SRS/DPD/DDP

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